Реферат: The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II
All of the efforts proved to be too little, too late. The Japanese
war plan worked to perfection. On 7 December 1941, Japan paralyzed the Pacific
Fleet in its attack on Pearl Harbor. In the Philippines, Japanese fliers
destroyed most of MacArthur's air force on the ground. Freed of effective
opposition, Japanese forces took Burma, Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East
Indies in rapid succession. By March 1942 the Japanese had conquered an empire.
Only MacArthur's beleaguered American-Filipino army still held out on the main
Philippine island of Luzon.
A Japanese army had landed in northern Luzon on 22 December 1941 and
began to push southward toward Manila. At first, MacArthur was inclined to meet
the Japanese on the beaches. But he had no air force, and the U.S. Navy's tiny
Asiatic fleet was in no position to challenge Japan at sea. The U.S. regulars
and Philippine Scouts were excellent troops but were outnumbered and without
air support. Giving up his initial strategy of defeating the enemy on the
beaches, MacArthur decided to withdraw to the Bataan Peninsula. There he could
pursue a strategy of defense and delay, shortening his lines and using the
mountainous, jungle-covered terrain to his advantage. Perhaps he could even
hold out long enough for a relief force to be mounted in the United States.
But too many people crowded into Bataan, with too little food and
ammunition. By March it was clear that help from the United States was not
coming. Nevertheless, the American-Filipino force, wracked by dysentery and
malaria, continued to fight. In March President Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to
escape to Australia. He left his command to Lt. Gen. Jonathan Wainwright and to
Maj. Gen. Edward King, who on 9 April was forced to surrender the exhausted and
starving Bataan force. Wainwright continued to resist on the small fortified
island of Corregidor in Manila Bay until 6 May under constant Japanese
artillery and air bombardment. After Japanese troops stormed ashore on the
island, Wainwright agreed to surrender Corregidor and all other troops in the
islands. By 9 May 1942, the battle for the Philippines had ended, though many
Americans and Filipinos took to the hills and continued a guerrilla war against
the Japanese.
The courageous defense of Bataan had a sad and ignominious end.
Marching their prisoners toward camps in northern Luzon, the Japanese denied
food and water to the sick and starving men. When the weakest prisoners began
to straggle, guards shot or bayoneted them and threw the bodies to the side of
the road. Japanese guards may have killed 600 Americans and 10,000 Filipino
prisoners. News of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had outraged the
American people; news of the "Bataan Death March" filled them with
bitter hatred.
By May 1942 the Japanese had succeeded beyond their wildest
expectations. A vast new empire had fallen into their hands so quickly, and at
so little cost, that they were tempted to go further. If their forces could
move into the Solomon Islands and the southern coast of New Guinea, they could
threaten Australia and cut the American line of communications to MacArthur's
base there. If they could occupy Midway Island, only 1,000 miles from Honolulu,
they could force the American fleet to pull back to the west coast. In Japanese
overconfidence lay the seeds of Japan's first major defeats.
The Tide Turns
Japanese fortunes turned sour in mid-1942. Their uninterrupted
string of victories ended with history's first great carrier battles. In May
1942 the Battle of the Coral Sea halted a new Japanese offensive in the south
Pacific. A month later the Japanese suffered a devastating defeat at the Battle
of Midway in the central Pacific. Now American and Australian forces were able
to begin two small counteroffensives--one in the Solomons and the other on New
Guinea's Papuan peninsula. The first featured the Marine Corps and the Army;
the second, the Army and the Australian Allies.
American resources were indeed slim. When MacArthur arrived in
Australia in March 1942, he found, to his dismay, that he had little to
command. Australian militia and a few thousand U.S. airmen and service troops
were his only resources. The Australian 7th Division soon returned from North
Africa, where it had been fighting the Germans, and two U.S. National Guard
divisions, the 32d and the 41st, arrived in April and May. MacArthur had enough
planes for two bomber squadrons and six fighter squadrons. With only these
forces, he set out to take Papua, while Admiral Nimitz, with forces almost
equally slim, attacked Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands.
Of all the places where GIs fought in the Second World War,
Guadalcanal and the Papuan peninsula may have been the worst. Though separated
by 800 miles of ocean, the two were similarly unhealthful in terrain and
climate. The weather on both is perpetually hot and wet; rainfall may exceed
200 inches a year, and during the rainy season deluges, sometimes 8 to 10
inches of rain, occur daily. Temperatures in December reach the high eighties,
and humidity seldom falls below 80 percent. Terrain and vegetation are equally
foreboding--dark, humid,
jungle-covered mountains inland, and evil-smelling swamps along the
coasts. Insects abound. The soldiers and marines were never dry; most fought
battles while wracked by chills and fever. For every two soldiers lost in
battle, five were lost to disease--especially malaria, dengue, dysentery, or
scrub typhus, a dangerous illness carried by jungle mites. Almost all suffered
"jungle rot," ulcers caused by skin disease.
Guadalcanal lay at the southeast end of the Solomons, an island
chain 600 miles long. Navy carriers and other warships supported the landings,
but they could not provide clear air or naval superiority. The marines landed
on 7 August 1942, without opposition, and quickly overran an important
airfield. That was the last easy action on Guadalcanal. The carriers sailed
away almost as soon as the marines went ashore. Then Japanese warships
surprised the supporting U.S. naval vessels at the Battle of Savo Island and
quickly sank four heavy cruisers and one destroyer. Ashore, the Japanese Army fought
furiously to regain the airfield. Through months of fighting the marines barely
held on; some American admirals even thought that the beachhead would be lost.
But gradually land-based aircraft were ferried in to provide air cover, and the
Navy was able to return. As the Japanese continued to pour men into the fight,
Guadalcanal became a battle of attrition.
Slowly American resources grew, while the Japanese were increasingly
unable to make up their losses. In October soldiers of the Americal Division joined
the battle; in November the Navy won a smashing victory in the waters offshore;
and in early 1943 the Army's 25th Infantry Division was committed as well.
Soldiers now outnumbered marines, and the ground forces were reorganized as the
XIV Corps, commanded by Army Mail Gen. Alexander M. Patch. As the Japanese lost
the ability to supply their forces, enemy soldiers began to starve in the
jungles. But not until February--six months after the initial landing--was
Guadalcanal finally secured.
Meanwhile, 800 miles to the west on the eastern peninsula of New
Guinea, another shoestring offensive began. Even after the Battle of the Coral
Sea, the Japanese persisted in their efforts to take Port Moresby, a strategic
town on New Guinea's southern coast. In late July 1942 they landed on the north
coast of the huge, mountainous island and began to make their way south toward
Port Moresby, across the towering Owen Stanley Mountains. Almost impassable in
normal circumstances, the trail they followed was a quagmire under constant
rain. Supply became impossible; food ran short; fever and dysentery set in.
Defeated just short of their goal by Australian defenses, the Japanese
retreated. Meanwhile, MacArthur had decided to launch a counteroffensive
against the fortified town of Buna and other Japanese-held positions on the
northern coast. He sent portions of the Australian 7th and U.S. 32d Divisions
over the same mountainous jungle tracks earlier used by the Japanese. The
result was the same. By the time his troops reached the northern coast, they
were almost too debilitated to fight. Around Buna and the nearby village of
Gona the Japanese holed up in coconut-log bunkers that were impervious to
small-arms and mortar fire. The Americans lacked artillery, flamethrowers, and tanks.
While they struggled to dig the defenders out, malnutrition, fever, and jungle
rot ravaged the troops. Like the troops on Guadalcanal, the Aussies and the men
of the 32d barely held on.
The Japanese also faced serious problems. Their commanders had to
choose between strengthening Guadalcanal or Buna. Choosing Guadalcanal, they
withdrew some support from the Buna garrison. Growing American air power made
it impossible for the Japanese Navy to resupply their forces ashore, and their
troops began to run short of food and ammunition. By December they were on the
edge of starvation. Here the battle of attrition lasted longer, and not until
January 1943 was the last Japanese resistance eliminated.
Buna was costlier in casualties than Guadalcanal, and in some
respects it was an even nastier campaign. The terrain was rougher; men who
crossed the Owen Stanleys called that march their toughest experience of the
war. The Americans lacked almost everything necessary for success--weapons,
proper clothing, insect repellents, and adequate food. "No more
Bunas," MacArthur pledged. For the rest of the war his policy was to
bypass Japanese strongpoints. When the battles for Guadalcanal and Buna began,
the Americans had insufficient strength to win. American strength increased as
the battle went on. Over the next three years it would grow to overwhelming
proportions.
Twin Drives to American Victory
As late as 1943 the American Joint Chiefs of Staff had not adopted a
clear strategy for winning the war in the Pacific. Early in the war they
assumed that the burden of the land fighting against Japan would fall on
Chinese forces. The bulk of Japan's army was deployed in China, and Chinese
leaders had an immense manpower pool to draw on. But supplying and training the
Chinese Army proved to be an impossible task. Moreover, fighting in China did
not lead to any strategic objective.
Instead, the hard-won successes in the Solomons and Papua and the
growing strength of MacArthur's and Nimitz's forces gave the Joint Chiefs the
means to strike at the Japanese in the Pacific. They decided to launch two
converging offensives toward the Japanese islands. Using Army ground forces,
land-based air power, and a fleet of old battleships and cruisers, MacArthur
would leapfrog across the northern coast of New Guinea toward the Philippines.
Nimitz, using carrier-based planes and Marine and Army ground forces, would
island-hop across the central Pacific. The strategy was frankly opportunistic,
and it left unanswered the questions of priorities and final objectives.
At the heart of the strategy were the developing techniques of
amphibious warfare and tactical air power. Putting troops ashore in the face of
a determined enemy had always been one of war's most dangerous and complicated
maneuvers. World War II proved that the assault force needed air and sea
supremacy and overwhelming combat power to be successful. Even then, dug-in
defenders could take a heavy toll of infantry coming over the beaches. Special
landing craft had to be built to bring tanks and artillery ashore with the infantry,
and both direct air support and effective naval gunfire were essential.
MacArthur's leaps up the northern coast of New Guinea were measured precisely
by the range of his fighter-bombers. The primary task of Nimitz's carriers was
to support and defend the landing forces. As soon as possible after the
landings, land-based planes were brought in to free the carriers for other
operations.
The islands of the central Pacific had little resemblance to the
fetid jungles of Guadalcanal and New Guinea. Atolls like Tarawa or Kwajalein
were necklaces of hard coral surrounding lagoons of sheltered water. Where the
coral rose above water, small narrow islands took form. These bits of sand
furnished little room for maneuver and frequently had to be assaulted
frontally. Larger islands like Guam and Saipan were volcanic in origin, with
rocky ridges to aid the defense; the shrapnel effect of shell bursts was
multiplied by bits of shattered rock.
In November 1943 Nimitz's island-hopping campaign began with his
assaults on Betio in the Tarawa Atoll and at Makin a hundred miles north. It
was a costly beginning. Elements of the Army's 27th Infantry Division secured
Makin with relative ease, but at Betio the 2d Marine Division encountered
stubborn and deadly resistance. Naval gunfire and air attacks had failed to
eliminate the deeply dug-in defenders, and landing craft grounded on reefs
offshore, where they were destroyed by Japanese artillery. As costly as it was,
the lessons learned there proved useful in future amphibious operations. Like
MacArthur, Nimitz determined to bypass strongly held islands and strike at the
enemy's weak points.
During January 1944 landings were made in the Marshalls at Kwajalein
and Eniwetok followed by Guam and Saipan in the Marianas during June and July.
Because the Marianas were only 1,500 miles from Tokyo, the remaining Japanese
carriers came out to fight. The resulting Battle of the Philippine Sea was a
disaster for the Japanese. In what U.S. Navy pilots called "the great
Marianas turkey shoot," Japanese carrier power was effectively eliminated.
Almost as soon as the Marianas were cleared, the air forces began to
prepare airfields to receive new heavy bombers, the B-29s. With a range
exceeding 3,000 miles, B-29s could reach most Japanese cities, including Tokyo.
In November 1944 the Twentieth Air Force began a strategic bombing campaign
against Japan, which indirectly led to one of the bitterest island fights of
the war. Tiny Iwo Jima, lying 750 miles southeast of Tokyo, was needed both as
an auxiliary base for crippled B-29s returning from their bombing raids over
Japan and as a base for long-range escort fighters. The fight for the
five-mile-long island lasted five weeks, during February and March 1945, and
cost more than 25,000 dead--almost 6,000 Americans of the 4th and 5th Marine
Divisions and 20,000 Japanese.
While Nimitz crossed the central Pacific, MacArthur pushed along the
New Guinea coast, preparing for his return to the Philippines. Without
carriers, his progress was slower but less costly than Nimitz's. After clearing
the Buna area in January 1943, MacArthur spent the next year conquering
northeastern New Guinea and the eight months that followed moving across the
northern coast of Netherlands New Guinea to the island of Morotai. Because he
had to cover his landings with land-based planes, he was limited to bounds of
200 miles or less on a line of advance almost 2,000 miles long. Furthermore, he
had to build airfields as he went. By October 1944 MacArthur was ready for a
leap to the Philippines, but this objective was beyond the range of his planes.
Nimitz loaned him Admiral William F. Halsey's heavy carriers, and, on 20
October 1944, MacArthur's Sixth Army landed on Leyte Island in the central
Philippines.
The Japanese reacted vigorously. For the first time in the war they
employed Kamikaze attacks, suicide missions flown by young, half-trained
pilots. And they used their last carriers as decoys to draw Halsey's carriers
away from the beachheads. With Halsey out of the battle and the landing forces
without air cover, the Japanese planned to use conventional warships to brush aside
the remaining American warships and destroy the support vessels anchored off
the beaches. They almost succeeded. In the naval Battle of Leyte Gulf, the big
guns of the big ships, not carrier planes, decided the battle. The Japanese
naval forces were decimated. Japan no longer had an effective navy.
As violent as they were, most island fights involved small units and
were mercifully short. However, the last two major campaigns of the Pacific
war--Luzon and Okinawa--took on some of the character of the war in Europe.
They were long fights on larger land masses, with entire armies in sustained
combat over the course of several months. Japanese defenders on Luzon numbered
262,000 under Lt. Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita, perhaps the best field commander in
the Japanese Army. Yamashita refused an open battle, knowing that superior
firepower and command of the air would favor the Americans. Instead, he
prepared defensive positions where his forces could deny the Americans
strategic points like roads and airfields. He wanted to force the Americans to
attack Japanese positions in a new battle of attrition.
His plan worked. MacArthur's Sixth Army under Lt. Gen. Walter
Krueger landed on Luzon on 9 January 1945 and began the Army's longest land
campaign in the Pacific. MacArthur's forces fought for almost seven months and
took nearly 40,000 casualties before finally subduing the Japanese.
The largest landings of Nimitz's central Pacific drive were carried
out on Okinawa, only 300 miles from Japan, on 1 April 1945. Before the fight
was over three months later, the entire Tenth Field Army-- four Army infantry
divisions and two Marine divisions--had been deployed there. Like his
counterpart on Luzon, the Japanese commander on Okinawa, Lt. Gen. Mitsuru
Ushijima, refused to fight on the beaches and instead withdrew into the rocky
hills to force a battle of attrition. Again the strategy worked. U.S.
casualties were staggering, the largest of the Pacific war. Over 12,000
American soldiers, sailors, and marines died during the struggle. At Okinawa
the Japanese launched the greatest Kamikaze raids of the war, and the results
were frightening--26 ships sunk and 168 damaged. Almost 40 percent of the
American dead were sailors lost to Kamikaze attacks.
When the Luzon and Okinawa battles ended in July, the invasion of
the southernmost Japanese island of Kyushu had already been ordered by the
Joint Chiefs. The date was set for 1 November 1945. Kyushu would furnish air
and naval bases to intensify the air bombardment and strengthen the naval
blockade around Honshu, the main island of Japan. A massive invasion in the
Tokyo area was scheduled for 1 March 1946 if Japanese resistance continued.
With the Okinawa experience fresh in their minds, many planners feared that the
invasion of Japan would produce a bloodbath.
In fact, Japan was already beaten. It was defenseless on the seas;
its air force was gone; and its cities were being burned out by incendiary
bombs. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August and the
Soviet declaration of war on 8 August forced the leaders of Japan to recognize
the inevitable. On 15 August 1945, Emperor Hirohito announced Japan's surrender
to the Japanese people and ordered Japanese forces to lay down their arms.
Despite their earlier suicidal resistance, they immediately did so. With V-J
Day--2 September 1945--the greatest war in human history came to an end.
Aftermath
The United States emerged from the war with global military
commitments that included the occupation of Germany and Japan and the oversight
of Allied interests in liberated areas. Almost 13 million Americans were in
uniform at the end of the war; over 8 million of them were soldiers. But the
impulse was strong to follow the patterns of the past and dismantle this force.
Families pressed the government to "bring the boys home," and
soldiers overseas demanded the acceleration of the separation process. American
monopoly of the atomic bomb seemed to furnish all the power that American
security interests needed. Some air power advocates even argued that the bomb
made armies and navies obsolete.
President Roosevelt had died in April 1945, on the eve of victory.
The new President, Harry S. Truman, and his advisers tried to resist the
political pressures for hasty demobilization. Truman wanted to retain a postwar
Army of 1.5 million, a Navy of 600,000, and an Air Force of 400,000. But
neither Congress nor the American public was willing to sustain such a force.
Within five months of V-J Day, 8.5 million servicemen and women had been mustered
out, and in June of the following year only two full Army divisions were
available for deployment in an emergency. By 1947 the Army numbered a mere
700,000--sixth in size among the armies of the world.
Yet too much had changed for the Army to return to its small and
insular prewar status. Millions of veterans now remembered their service with
pride. The beginning of the Cold War, especially the Berlin blockade of 1948,
dramatically emphasized the need to remain strong. The Army had become too
deeply intertwined with American life and security to be reduced again to a
constabulary force. Moreover, the time was not far off when new conflicts would
demonstrate the limits of atomic power and prove that ground forces were as
necessary as they had been in the past.
Further Readings
Despite its age, Charles B. MacDonald's The Mighty Endeavor:
American Armed Forces in the European Theater in World War 11 (1969) remains a
sound, informative, and highly readable survey of the American role in the war
in Europe. For the interwar Army, I. B. Holley, jr.'s General John M. Palmer,
Citizen Soldiers and the Army of a Democracy (1982) is good for the early
years. Palmer was the architect of the National Defense Act of 1920. D. Clayton
James' The Years of MacArthur: Volume 1, 1880-1941 (1970), looks at the
interwar Army in terms of the man who dominated it in the 1930s, while Forrest
Pogue's George C. Marshall, Volume 1: Education of a General, 1880-1939 (1963),
focuses on the man who oversaw its transformation into a powerful, modern mass
army. Volume 2: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1945 (1986), and Volume 3: Organizer of
Victory, 1943-1945 (1973), are the best sources on the War Department and the
General Staff and cover an enormous range of topics from strategy and logistics
to personalities.
Len Deighton's Blitzkrieg: From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of
Dunkirk (1980) is a popular, semijournalistic account that places German
tactical and operational innovations in the context of interwar German Army
politics and the Nazi rise to power and also discusses the relationship between
tactics, equipment, and organization in a nontechnical way. Fire-Power: British
Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-1945 (1982), by Shelford Bidwell and
Dominick Graham, is a seminal and important book, tracing changes in military
doctrine from the perspective of the artillery arm from World War I through
World War II. Bidwell and Graham analyze the origins of Blitzkrieg tactics and
panzer organizations and the evolution of indirect artillery fire and their
impact on war.
W. G. F. Jackson's Battle for North Africa, 1940-1943 (1975), is
reliable, and Martin Blumenson's Kasserine Pass (1967) can be supplemented by
Ralph Ingersoll's The Battle Is the Pay-off (1943). Written in the immediate
aftermath of the Kasserine Pass debacle by a journalist-captain who accompanied
the Rangers on their raid against the Italian-held pass at El Guettar, it has
the gritty immediacy of a contemporary first-person account and ends with an
impassioned plea for tougher physical conditioning and more realistic training.
A useful antidote to grand theoretical speculations about the nature
of war is John Ellis' The Sharp End: The Fighting Man in World War II (1980).
Using a vast array of first-person accounts, Ellis focuses on the experience of
frontline combat in both theaters. Ellis has also written Cassino: Hollow
Victory (1984), a gripping and critical account of Allied attempts to break
through the mountains of central Italy, an effort which, the author believes,
was crippled by a self-serving and inept Allied high command. Useful companions
are Wyford Vaughan-Thomas' Anzio (1961) and Martin Blumenson's Anzio: The
Gamble That Failed (1963).
Max Hastings' Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (1984) is
among the best of the new books on the invasion. A careful and skilled
journalist, Hastings asks why it took so long for the Allies to break out of
the beachhead. He finds the flawed performance of the citizen armies of Britain
and the United States at fault, when compared to the skill and proficiency of
the Germans. Russell F. Weigley, in Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of
France and Germany, 1944-1945 (1986), asks similar questions about American
combat performance and advances a provocative thesis, suggesting that the U.S.
Army never reconciled its two conflicting heritages--that of the frontier
constabulary, with its emphasis on mobility, and that of U. S. Grant's direct
power drive in the Civil War. Thus, U.S. combat formations in World War II were
structured for mobility, while American strategy and operations called for
head-on confrontations with the center of enemy strength.
Ralph F. Bennett's ULTRA in the West: The Normandy Campaign,
1944-1945 (1980), heavily based on the original, declassified decrypts, is
sound on ULTRA'S impact on the land campaign. Charles B. MacDonald's A Time for
Trumpets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge (1985) updates earlier
accounts of the German Ardennes offensive with the latest available information
about the Allied intelligence failure, while his Company Commander (1978) is
still one of the most moving and honest first-person accounts of small-unit
command responsibility available. (MacDonald was one of the youngest captains
in the Army in 1944 when his company was hit and overrun in the first hours of
the German offensive.)
Stephen Ambrose's Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight
D. Eisenhower (1970) is a judicious and balanced assessment of Eisenhower from
his arrival in Washington in December 1941 through the German surrender in May
1945. Omar N. Bradley's and Clay Blair's A General's Life (1983) is a far more
partisan biography of the so-called G.I. General, which provides a sometimes
disconcerting glimpse of the internal tensions and disagreements within the
Allied high command in Europe. It should be balanced with Nigel Hamilton's
exhaustive, but also pugnaciously partisan three-volume biography, Monty: The
Making of a General, 1887-1942 (1981), Monty: Master of the Battlefield,
1942-1944 (1983), and Monty: Final Years of the Field-Marshal, 1944-1976
(1987), and all can be supplemented by the fairly reliable official histories
produced by the American and British military services in the postwar period.
Two general histories provide excellent surveys of the Pacific war,
from the causes to the conclusion. John Toland's The Rising Sun, 1936-1945
(1971), views the war from the Japanese perspective and focuses on the war's
causes, Japanese war plans, and the early victorious campaigns from the vantage
point of Japan's military leadership. A counterpart volume is Eagle Against the
Sun (1985) by Ronald H. Spector. Like Toland, Spector covers the entire
conflict but views the war from the American perspective. Eagle Against the Sun
may be the best single-volume survey of the Pacific war yet written.
The historical literature on Pearl Harbor and the first six months
of the war in the Pacific is voluminous--so vast that readers must be
especially careful in their selections. Perhaps the best picture of life in the
prewar army is found in James Jones' fictional From Here to Eternity (1985).
The subject of Pearl Harbor has produced countless pages of description and
analysis, but much is of interest only to professional historians and
specialists in the subject. Two books of special value to the general reader
are Walter Lord's Day of Infamy (1957) and Gordon Prange's At Dawn We Slept
(1982). Day of Infamy begins in the predawn hours and details the fascinating,
dramatic events of the day the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. The book is
short, and Lord writes in a clear, journalistic style. At Dawn We Slept is a
more complete and exhaustive book on the attack, the events leading to it, and
the surrounding controversies. Although the book is over 700 pages long, the
style is readable, the story interesting, and the treatment complete. If a
student can read only one book on Pearl Harbor, Prange's work is the logical
choice.
The best single-volume survey of the first six months in the Pacific
after Pearl Harbor is John Toland's But Not in Shame (1961), which relates the
story of defeat in the Pacific with a true sense of heroism and tragedy.
Included are the American defeats at Pearl Harbor, Bataan, Corregidor, and Wake
Island, and the Allied failures in the Dutch East Indies and Singapore. Stanley
Falk's Bataan: March of Death (1984) is a moving and unbiased account of one of
the most emotional subjects in American military history.
The battles for Guadalcanal and for Buna went on simultaneously, but
Guadalcanal received far more attention from the American press at the time and
from historians since that date. However, the quality of the works on
Guadalcanal varies greatly. An older but reliable account is The Battle for
Guadalcanal (1979) by Samuel B. Griffith II, which can be supplemented by
Richard Tregaskis' Guadalcanal Diary (1984), a classic in war reporting that
came out of the fighting on Guadalcanal. For the Papua Campaign, Lida Mayo's
Bloody Buna (1979) not only chronicles the battles but also effectively conveys
the nightmarish qualities of fighting in New Guinea--the constant rain, the
disease, the lack of proper food and equipment, and the constant threat of
death from the Japanese or from the jungle.
Hundreds, if not thousands, of books have been written on the
campaigns that produced victory over Japan in the Pacific war. They range from
very detailed volumes in the official histories of the United States Army,
Navy, and Marine Corps to highly romanticized books on specific actions,
people, weapons, and so forth. The following three books are accurate,
balanced, and interesting accounts of the subject. Two sound works covering the
offensive period are D. Clayton James' The Years of MacArthur, 1941-1945
(1975), for the offensives in the Southwest Pacific and the Philippines, and
James and William Belote's Titans of the Seas (1974), an account of the carrier
battles in the Pacific. But no work better describes combat in the Pacific war
at the squad and platoon level than Island Victory (1983) by S. L. A. Marshall.
During World War II as a combat historian he gathered material for Island
Victory by interviewing infantrymen of the 7th Infantry Division who had just
cleared two small islands in the Kwajalein Atoll. The book tells the stories of
squad and platoon fights with holed-up Japanese on islands no more than 250
yards wide. There are no generals or colonels here, no high-level planning or
strategy. This is the story of ground combat from the vantage point of the
individual infantryman, and, like MacDonald's Company Commander, the work is a
testimony to the determination and heroism of the individual GI.
Note: The publication dates are shown for the most recent editions
listed in Books in Print. Many of these books were originally published years
earlier.
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