Реферат: Russian Federation Country Study. A Public Finance Perspective
Table A2 Comparison of GNP Growth in USSR and Western Countries 1961-85
(Average Annual Growth in Per Cent)
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USSR |
US |
FRG |
France |
Italy |
UK |
1961-65 |
4.8 |
4.6 |
4.8 |
5.8 |
5.2 |
3.2 |
1966-70 |
5.1 |
3.2 |
4.2 |
5.4 |
6.2 |
2.5 |
1971-75 |
3 |
2.2 |
2.1 |
4 |
2.4 |
2.2 |
1976-80 |
2.3 |
3.4 |
3.3 |
3.3 |
3.8 |
1.6 |
1981-85 |
1.9 |
2.4 |
1.3 |
1.1 |
0.9 |
1.9 |
Note: US
GNP calculated in 1982 prices. GNP growths of FRG, France, Italy and UK are
calculated from GDP in 1980 prices.
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Source:
Cohn (1987, p. 12) Authors' Source: Elliot and Dowla in International Journal
of Social Economics" v. 21 p. 78
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Table A3 Soviet state budget expenditures for consumer and food subsidies,
social insurance, and health care, 1985-1990
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Type of expenditure |
1985 |
1986 |
1987 |
1988 |
1989 |
1990 |
In billions of rubles (nominal)
Total state expenditures
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386.5 |
417.1 |
430.9 |
459.5 |
482.6 |
488.2 |
Consumer subsidies |
58.0 |
65.6 |
69.8 |
89.8 |
100.7 |
110.5 |
Food subsidies |
56.0 |
58.0 |
64.9 |
66.0 |
87.7 |
95.7 |
Social insurance and health care |
83.6 |
89.3 |
94.5 |
102.5 |
105.5 |
117.2 |
As percent of GNPConsumer subsidies
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7.5 |
8.2 |
8.5 |
10.3 |
10.9 |
11.6 |
Social insurance and health care |
10.7 |
11.2 |
11.5 |
11.7 |
11.4 |
12.3 |
Source: Anders Aslund, "Gorbachev, Perestroyka, and Economic
Crisis," Problems of Communism, vol. 40, nos. 1-2, Jan.-Apr. 1991, p. 25
a. Estimated figures.
Authors' Source: Linda J. Cook. 1995 The Soviet Social Contract and Why It
Failed p. 148
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Table A5 Significance of Public Transfer in Household Income for
households Receiving the Benefit
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Very |
Poor |
Poor |
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Not |
Poor |
Transfer |
% Receiving the benefit |
Avg % of Recipient Household Income |
% Receiving the benefit |
Avg. % of Recipient Household Income |
% Receiving the benefit |
Avg. % of Recipient Household Income |
Family Allowances |
288.8 |
23.6 |
32.4 |
14.5 |
25.7 |
5.9 |
Pensions |
0.3 |
75 |
41 |
66.9 |
48.7 |
58.4 |
Unemployment Benefit |
0.8 |
21.7 |
0.4 |
17.8 |
0.3 |
9.8 |
Subsidies from Local Authorities |
100.4 |
9.6 |
10.4 |
9.6 |
14.5 |
8.1 |
Subsidies from Enterprises |
55 |
9.4 |
8.7 |
10.8 |
17.7 |
11.7 |
Scholarships |
50.2 |
17.8 |
6.2 |
18.2 |
6.7 |
8.7 |
All Transfers* |
666.8 |
58.5 |
70.9 |
48.4 |
74.4 |
42.6 |
*All transfers includes those listed (except subsidies from enterprises,
which are included with subsidies from local authorities) plus welfare.
Note that the overall average percent of the household income can be
calculated form the two values reported for each poverty status.
Source: RLMS. Round 4. October 1993-
February 1994.
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A6
List of Goods in Everyday Demand and Services to the Population which are
Exempt from the Sales Tax
Children's food, meat, meat products
(except delicatessen products), milk and milk products, margarine, fats, bakery
products, flour, pasta products, eggs, tea, sugar, salt, vegetables (cabbage,
carrots, beet, onions, potatoes),fish and fish products, vegetable oil, mineral
water, children's items, textbooks for general education schools, specialist
educational and medical equipment and medical supplies;
Children's items, including clothing, footwear,
furniture, bed-linen, school uniform, toys and sports items; Consumer goods on
lists approved by the councils of ministers of the republics within the USSR,
kray soviet executive committees, oblast soviet executive committees, Moscow
and Leningrad city soviet executive committees and executive committees of
autonomous oblast and autonomous okrug soviets of people's deputies;
A7 USSR: SALES TAX DECREE Full text of instruction issued by USSR Ministry of Finance and
dated February 11, 1991 ). The provisions include some of the following:
1.
Liability extends to joint ventures and Soviet
organizations engaged in importing;
2.
Joint ventures will pay tax on hard currency
sales in rubles, converted at the prevailing commercial rate of exchange fixed
by USSR Gosbank;
3.
Liability extends over a wide range of supply,
including professional, informational, communication, etc. services;
4.
The tax rate is 5%;
5.
Tax exemption applies to sales of precious
metals, coal shale, export services, trade between parts of a constituted
enterprise.
SOURCE: EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN February 23,
199. P19
A8 Taxable income received in calendar
year. Source: Tax 96 TNI 4-1 (Foreign Taxation) (Doc 96-947)
less than 12 million Rubles 12 % from 12 million Rubles 1, 44 million Rubles
+to 24 million Rubles 20 % of the sum exceeding 12 million Rubles from 24
million Rubles 3.84 million Rubles to 36 million Rbls, 25 percent of the sum
exceeding 24 million Rubles above 48 million Rubles 10.44 million Rubles + 35
percent of the sum exceeding 48 million Rubles
1.
Isaak I. Dore , 1995 Distribution of
Governmental Power Under the Constitution of Russia" in Parker School
Journal of Eastern European Law" v. 2 p. 675
2.
ibid p. 681
3.
ibid p. 865
4.
ibid p. 691
5.
ibid p. 678
6.
ibid p. 688
7.
With the current political situation we can say
that the budget as a whole, without doubt, will not pass the Duma by the end of
the year.
8.
The Moscow Times May 21, 1996. p. 54.
9.
World Paper. September, 1996 p. 33
10. TNI 73-22, 1996
11. TNI 22/16, 1992, John Turro
12. Joint Letter No VG-4-12/25N of June 16, 1995
13. Doc 96-947
14. Much of the literature on tax assignment argues that the personal
income tax(PIT), generally one of the more important taxes in revenue terms,
should be retained by the central government, largely for redistributional and
stabilization reasons. Nevertheless, the central government may give local
governments a share in the PIT.
15. Tax Analysts, Tax Notes International. January 25, 1993
16. NOVECONCOMMERSANT. July 28, 1994. p. 2
17. In Russia, this tax is mostly levied at a national level because of
the administrative convenience, these taxes have been levied at the producer
level, not the retail level; and in the transition economy context this often
translates into a tax on a few manufacturers as in Russia, for example, there are
cigarette factories in only 21 of its 2000 "raions" (Comparative
Economic Studies Winter 1994, Vol. 36, No. 4), or sometimes on the single
monopoly producer. Thus, only a few producing districts would benefit from
levying these taxes and revenues from them would accrue to only a few
localities
18. Tax Analysts, Tax Notes International. January 25, 1993
19. Tax Analysts, Tax Notes International. January 25, 1993
20. Tax Analysts, Tax Notes International.January 25, 1993
21. The British Broadcasting Corporation March 15, 1991
22. Scot Antel. The Moscow Times. May 21, 1996
23. Though temporary steps were made like creating special colleges that
are attached to courts of arbitration, we suppose that creating a special tax
courts is essential here
24. Of course, taxes existed but people could not evade them as they
were centralized and in theory all means of production were owned by the state.
25. Washington Post. October 12, 1996. p. A25
26. But we are afraid that this provision will not benefit the economy
27. Betsy McKay. The Wall Street Journal.October 29, 1996. p. A12
28. Comment & Analysis; Statistics; Forecast; November 1996 p. 2
29. Information Services Quest Economics Database Credit Suisse
Financial Forecast, 1996
30. Reuter Textline Reinsurance, October 31, 1996
31. In our opinion, inflation will come down further in 1997, to
approximately 15 percent. Also, Russia continues to fail in its economic
performance of it fiscal and monetary policy within the framework established
by the International Monetary Fund.
32. The Moscow Times. March 27, 1996
33. Dmitry Falcovich, head of the macroeconomic department with
Alliance-Menatep
34. Russian Federation: Toward Medium-Term Viability. 1996. IBRD/World
Bank p.39
35. Fiscal Management in Russia. 1996. IBRD p. 39
36. Fiscal Management in Russia. p. 22
37. John E. Elliot and A.F. Dowla. Gorbachev, Perestroika and
Democratizing Socialism" in International Journal of Social
Economics" v. 21 p. 78
38. Linda J. Cook. 1995 The Soviet Social Contract and Why It
Failed." Harvard University Press: Cambridge p.2 Cook suggests the following
as empirical evidence: 1. That the Soviet regime consistently deliver to
workers economic security and social welfare; 2. That the regime deliver these
policy goods because it is constrained by it perception of workers'
expectations or its fear of labor discontent if it fails to deliver them; [and]
3. that workers give in exchange political compliance and quiescence. p. 5
39. Vladmir Mau. 1996 The Political History of Economic Reform in
Russia, 1985-1994. Center for Research into Communist Economies p. 59
40. John Dunlop. 1993. The Rise of Russia and the Collapse of the Soviet
Empire. Princeton University Press: Princeton. p. 267
41. Cook p.141
42. ibid p.187
43. Thomas A. Mroz and Barry M. Popkin. 1995. Poverty and Economic
Transition in the Russian Federation" in Economic Development and Cultural
Change . V 44 p.3
44. ibid p.4
45. ibid p. 4
46. Russia: Social Protection During Transition and Beyond International
Bank For Reconstruction and Development Report No. 11748-RU. p. 23
47. Vladimir Mikhalev Social Security in Russia under Economic
Transformation" in Europe-Asia Studies v. 48 n.1 (note: As this source
came from an electronic medium, I have omitted page numbers--DL)
48. ibid
49. IBRD Report No. 11748-Ru. p. 35
50. ibid p. 11
51. EBRD p. 40
52. ibid
53. BISNIS Country Report
54. OMRI November 31, 1996
55. OMRI October 4, 1996
56. Financial Times. September 23, 1996
57. Of course, it is possible to lower administrative costs and improve
overall efficiency in the tax system by going to a more computerized system but
resistance to change due to unquestionable job loss is quite evident in the
Russian government.
58. Komsomol'skaya Pravda. Sept. 24, 1996
The file was preapred by Dmitri
Maslitchenko dmitri@mailroom.com
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